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The problem of superannuated justices is fully stated by Stephen Calabresi and 
James Lindgren1 and others in this symposium.  Robert Nagel has stated additional 
reasons for Congress to address that problem as part of a larger one.2  My reasons like 
his go beyond concern for the disabilities of aging or the politics of the appointment 
process.  The Court needs to be less exalted as an icon.  It ought to be seen as a part 
of a larger institution, the federal judiciary, a vast enterprise afflicted with normal human 
failings, which should be as accountable to the other branches of government as those 
branches are to it.  Congress has long neglected its duty implicit in the constitutional 
doctrine of separation of powers to constrain the tendency of the Court, the academy 
and the legal profession to inflate the Court’s status and power.  The term “life tenure” is 
a significant source of a sense of royal status having not only the adverse cultural 
effects noted by Nagel, but also doleful effects on the administration and enforcement of 
law in the other federal courts for which the Court and Congress share responsibility.  
Fixing the superannuation problem will not fix everything, but it would be a benign step 
in the right direction.  I will conclude by suggesting numerous related reforms that might 
help more, all of which have been proposed to Congress in times past.  Perhaps 
legislation addressing the superannuation problem would make it more likely that other 
needed reforms might be achieved in the future, by Congress or by a judiciary more 
aware of its own frailties. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Duke University.  Special thanks to Roger Cramton, Richard Epstein, Peter Fish., 
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1 See supra Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, pp. ???-???. 
2 See supra Robert F. Nagel, A Comment on Limiting Life Tenure, pp. ???-???.  In the same vein is Robert 
F. Bauer, A Court Too Supreme for Our Good, Washington Post (Aug. 7, 2005). 
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THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS 
The arguments made by numerous authors3 that statutory term limits of any kind 
would violate Article III of the Constitution are framed as if addressed to the Court and 
its celebrants.  But the forum to consider those arguments is Congress.4  I commend to 
Congress the contrary views on constitutionality expressed in this symposium by Roger 
Cramton,5 Scot Powe,6 and Sanford Levinson.7  As they contend, the purpose of Article 
III is to assure the independence of the federal judiciary by securing judges from reward 
or intimidation.  The constitutional objections to term limits legislation rest on restrictive 
readings of the terms “good behavior” and “one Supreme Court” that cannot be justified 
by reference to any substantial public harms that might result from a more generous 
reading that allows Congress to do its job.  Justices have long interpreted the text of the 
Constitution loosely, a practice that may indeed have been indispensable in keeping the 
Republic more or less on track for two and a quarter centuries.  It would be ironic if an 
uncharitable reading of that text led Congress in an action of self-restraint to forego 
enactment of reasonable constraints on justices. 
If Congressional legislation imposing term limits on justices were enacted and 
were then held unconstitutional by the Court, it would be time to think about a 
constitutional amendment.  At such a time an amendment might be a realistic 
possibility.  Until then, academic objections to the constitutionality of such legislation 
should be recognized as arguments for the status quo. 
 
                                                 
3 See supra Calabresi & Lindgen, pp. ???-???; see infra Ward Farnsworth, Some Overlooked Consequences 
of Life Tenure for Supreme Court Justices, pp. ???-???; see infra John Harrison, The Power of Congress over The 
Terms of Judges of the Supreme Court pp. ???-???; see infra William Van Alstyne, The Proposals for Term Limits 
on the Supreme Court: A Brief Critical Review, pp. ???-???. 
4 David P. Currie is providing a history of Congressional attention to the Constitution.  See his The 
Constitution in Congress: Democrats and Whigs 1829-1861 (2005); The Constitution in Congress: the Jeffersonians, 
1801-1829 (2001); The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801 (1999).  It is fair to say that 
Congress has been willing and able to read the Constitution for itself. 
5 See infra Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, pp. ???-???. 
6 See supra L. A. Powe, Jr., “Marble Palace . . We’ve Got A Problem with You”, pp. ???-???. 
7 See infra Sanford Levinson, Life Tenure and the Supreme Court: What is to Be Done?, pp. ???-???. 
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THE SUPREME COURT AS THE ONE AMONG MANY 
Perhaps in part because my professional preoccupation for the last half a century 
has been not with the Supreme Court but with other federal courts, I view the “one 
Supreme Court” as the center of a network of subordinate institutions that should be 
and are constitutionally accountable to representatives of the people they serve.  The 
“lower” courts shape themselves to the highest Court and also influence the Court in 
ways making them inseparable.  When the whole enterprise has overreached itself, as it 
has, that is a problem that Congress has a constitutional duty to address.8  The Court, 
afflicted with its quasi-royal sense of itself, has led the federal courts at all levels to 
forsake the modest role of deciding the cases and controversies that the Constitution 
commissions them to decide in order to concentrate on the more exalted and gratifying 
work of making law on subjects of their own choosing. 
Although political scientists and others occupied with opinion sampling may 
question my premise,9 I share with others (at least some of whom are federal judges) a 
sense that there is in the land a growing hostility to the federal judiciary and to the 
government of which it is a part.  Why should this be?  One possible reason is that 
foretold by Montesquieu, that a republic’s status as The Great Power results in an 
infection of arrogance causing its citizens to be more resentful of the leaders who 
govern them.10  Perhaps he was right; there is surely evidence of an infection of 
arrogance in many American institutions.  Resentment also seems to be associated with 
despair over the nation’s moral state,11 and with a retreat from the optimism of The 
                                                 
8 See infra Ward Farnsworth, Some Overlooked Consequences of Life Tenure for Supreme Court Justices, 
pp. ???-??; see infra John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Terms of Judges of the Supreme Court pp. ???-
???; see infra Philip D. Oliver, A Clearly Constitutional Statutory Proposal, pp. ???-???; see infra William Van 
Alstyne, The Proposals for Term Limits on the Supreme Court: A Brief Critical Review, pp. ???-???. 
9 See infra Stephen B. Burbank, An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, 
pp. ???-???; but see Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees Judicial Activism Crisis, A.B.A.J., ereport, (September 30, 
2005). 
10 Charles Secondat de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Book VIII, Chap. 4 (Thomas Nugent trans., 
London: Nourse, 1750). 
11 I take this to be the subtext of Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won 
the Heart of America (2004). 
 
 4
Enlightenment on which our national ideology rests.12  Whatever the causes, those who 
retain progressive hopes, and see law as a possible instrument of their achievement, as 
I do, would do well, I perceive, to concede that fellow citizens protesting the moral and 
political leadership of an unaccountable judiciary placed on a pedestal of immortality 
may have a point.  Prudence calls for an offer of compromise and that is in my mind 
what our term limits proposals are about. 
 
THE FOUNDERS’ SURPRISE 
Those who wrote Article III did not see the federal judiciary, even the Supreme 
Court, as the superlegislators they have become.  The judges who were known to the 
Founders were employed merely to decide contested cases.  In the common law 
tradition familiar to eighteenth century lawyers, the judges entertaining appeals heard 
legal arguments and then expressed their decisions separately and orally, leaving it to a 
reporter and his readers to derive if possible any legal principles that might have been 
expressed in their diverse and unrehearsed utterances, a system depicted by Tennyson 
as “a lawless science,” a “codeless myriad of precedent,” and a mere “wilderness of 
single instances.”13  Judges made law, but unselfconsciously as they tried to apply it.  
So long as they made law only in that modest way, they were indeed, as Alexander 
Hamilton assured us, “the least dangerous branch.”14  One might fear or resent their 
power over litigants, but they were not viewed as effective makers of public policy. 
That changed in 1801 with the appointment of John Marshall as Chief Justice.  
Marshall’s first decision came in the form of a written opinion of the Court signed by all 
seven Justices. 15  Writing such an opinion is a deliberate legislative act quite different 
from any envisioned by those who created the Court.  The importance of the device in 
                                                 
12 Louis Dupre, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture 153-54 (2004); 
Jonathan Hill, Faith in the Age of Reason: The Enlightenment from Galileo to Kant 7 (2004). 
13 Alfred Lord Tennyson, “Aylmer’s Field,” lines 435-439, in The Poetic and Dramatic Works of Alfred 
Lord Tennyson 241, 246 (1898). 
14 The Federalist Papers 78: “the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of 
power.”  And see Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 
(1962).  Montesquieu put it most strongly:  “Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to nothing.” 
Supra  n. 10, Book XI, Chap. 6. 
15 The first appearance of the opinion of the court came in Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1 (1801). 
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elevating the judicial power was confirmed by its immediate adoption by state courts, 
and, before long, by courts of other nations, not least including England.16  Combined 
with the unquestioned constitutional power to invalidate legislation, the opinions of the 
Court soon became the source of constitutional law, making the justices authors and 
sometime revisors of a constitution that is an extended elaboration of the text written in 
1787 seldom amended by the almost impossible process set forth in its Article V.  This 
transformation of the Court was recognized and decried by Jeffersonians as an 
illegitimate seizure of legislative powers.17 
And in 1805, the Jeffersonian leaders of the Senate wisely forswore use of its 
impeachment power as a means of correcting Justice Samuel Chase’s misguided 
Federalist politics.18  But the resulting practice of legislative restraint liberated those 
writing the subtextual constitutional law from any direct personal accountability for the 
political decisions they had become empowered to make.  It became metaphorically 
appropriate, even if not literally correct, to speak of justices as officers enjoying “life 
tenure,” a phrase previously reserved for royalty. 
In a constitutional scheme of “checks and balances”, what were the checks to 
prevent justices from gradually rewriting the Constitution to accord to their preferences?  
This is an obvious question having no obvious answer.  And the Founders’ 
miscalculation in leaving that question open was soon recognized.  In the first half of the 
nineteenth century, all American state constitutions were revised to assure some form 
of rotation in high judicial offices and/or to provide other means of correcting bad law 
made by state judges in the opinions of their courts.19  Frederick Grimké, a justice of the 
                                                 
16 See Paul D. Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Political Consequences of Law Teaching, 41 Duke L. J. 
741, 753-754 (1992). 
17 E.g., John Taylor, Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated (1820). 
18 See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Samuel Chase and President 
Andrew Johnson 22-27 (1992). 
19 A Federalist legislature in New Hampshire in 1813 expelled all the Democratic judges from the state 
courts.  Edwin D. Sandborn, History of New Hampshire from Its First Discovery to the Year 1830 260-61 (1875).  
The Democratic legislature elected in Kentucky in 1824 fired all members of their highest court (who were Whigs) 
and replaced them, as punishment for decisions having unwelcome impact on .tenants and debtors.  Arndt H. 
Stickles, The Critical Court Struggle in Kentucky, 1819-1829 (1929).  For a review of issues and literature in later 
times, see Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability, 61-1 L. & Contemp. Probs. 79 
(1998) (Paul D. Carrington & D. Price Marshall, eds). 
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Ohio Supreme Court explained the view generally prevailing in antebellum times.20  He 
expressed what would later be designated as Legal Realism—the observation that high 
court judges are making political decisions—and he concluded that “[i]f then the judges 
are appointed for life, they may have the ability to act upon society, both inwardly and 
outwardly, to a greater degree than the other departments.”  And, he added, “if it is not 
wise to confer a permanent tenure of office upon the executive and legislative, it should 
not be conferred upon the judiciary; and the more so, because the legislative functions 
which the last perform is a fact entirely hidden from the great majority of the 
community.” 21 
 
LIVING WITH THE MISTAKE: THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Although few of his contemporaries expressed disagreement with Grimké, 
nothing was done by Congress in his time to limit the terms of justices sitting on the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  There were reasons that this was so. 
One was that the Supreme Court was an organ of a weak national government 
and was generally held in limited regard.  When the Court proclaimed the rights of the 
Cherokee to remain in Georgia,22 President Jackson simply defied it.23  When it 
unconstitutionally declared itself to be the premier authority on the nation’s private law 
governing contracts and property,24 a decision said to result from the superannuation 
and arrogance of Justice Story,25 the state supreme courts ignored it.  When a minor 
war arose between political factions in Rhode Island, the Court timidly feared to decide 
which was legitimate.26  When it declared that Americans of African ancestry had no 
                                                 
20 Frederick Grimké, Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions (H.W. Derby & 
Co., Cincinnati 1848), republished by Harvard University Press in 1968. 
21 Id. 355. 
22 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, (Pet.) 560-63 (1832).  See generally Jill Norgren, The Cherokee 
Case: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (1996). 
23 For an account, see Edward A, Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the 
Nullification Crisis, 39 J. S. Hist. 589 (1973). 
24 Swift v. Tyson ,41 U.S. 1 (16 Pet.) (1842). 
25 John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law 253 (1909).  The unconstitutionality of the decision 
was declared by the Court in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938). 
26 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (7 How.) (1849). 
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rights,27 the nation led by President Lincoln initiated a war to overrule it.  When it 
seemed that the Court might impede the war effort, Lincoln appointed a tenth justice to 
assure that it would not be able to marshal the votes to do so.28  When the chief justice 
issued a writ of habeas corpus to free a citizen who was organizing resistance to the 
military draft,29 Lincoln ordered the Army to defy the writ.  When it seemed that the 
Court might invalidate Reconstruction legislation, Congress foreclosed its jurisdiction.30  
And when the Court later invalidated the federal income tax,31 it was in due course 
reversed by constitutional amendment.32  No contested policy of substantial national 
concern that was announced by the Court in the nineteenth century was effectively 
maintained. 
It may also have been pertinent that nineteenth century federal judges were more 
frequently selected for their political prominence.33  Virtually all justices were then 
veterans of the political campaign trail because only such persons were visible to the 
Presidents who nominated them or the Congressmen who confirmed them.  Most were 
therefore able to maintain social and political ties to the legislators working elsewhere in 
the Capitol, and with those in the regions from which they came.  And they were 
therefore less likely to see themselves or to be seen by others as persons of 
exceptional power and status.  Nor was their high status entirely dependent on that of 
the office they held. 
And to the extent that the Court successfully exercised significant political power 
in the nineteenth century, its decisions generally involved enforcement of the federal 
                                                 
27 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (19 How.) (1857).  The decision in that case was at the time encouraged 
by the President and leading Senators.  On its effects, see Martin Siegel, The Taney Court, 1837-1864 66-68 (1987); 
Don E. Fehrenbacher, The “Dred Scott” Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics 307-313 (1978). 
28 On Lincoln’s appointment of Stephen Field, see Paul Kens, Justice Stephen Field: Shaping Liberty from 
The Gold Rush to The Gilded Age 95-96 (1997). 
29 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (4 Wall.) (1866). 
30 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (6 Wall. 318) (1868). 
31 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 429, 601 (1895). 
32 See Robert Stanley, Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order: Origins of the Federal Income Tax 1861-
1913 at 225-229 (1993). 
33 See, e.g., Maeva Marcus, Allen Chair Symposium 2004 Federal Judicial Selection: Symposium Article 
Federal Judicial Selection: The First Decade, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 797 (2005). 
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Constitution against allegedly miscreant state legislatures.  In that way, the Court played 
a significant role in the advent of America’s Gilded Age by invalidating state laws 
enacted to protect workers or regulate business.34  But Congress and the President did 
not much mind these transgressions, for it was only state governments that were 
directly disadvantaged.  And Christopher Tiedemann, a leading constitutional scholar of 
the era could reassure the nation that it need not worry:  “the Congress has power to 
increase the number of the Supreme Court judges, and thus, with the aid of the 
President, to change the composition and tendencies of the Court.  If at any time the 
Supreme Court should too persistently withstand any popular demand in a case in 
which the people will not submit to the judicial negative, by an increase in the number of 
judges . . . the popular will may be realized.” 35 
Finally, it was the fact in the nineteenth century that substantial turnover occurred 
naturally.  Many died while in office, some at advanced ages, but some at ages not so 
advanced.  And some retired without pay.  One cause of such resignations was the 
requirement imposed on the justices by Congress that they “ride circuit” in order to 
remain in contact with the people whom they governed.36  An aim of the requirement 
was to assure that the justices would write opinions of the court that expressed “the 
common thoughts of men.”37  Circuit-riding required annual trips, often of considerable 
length, and in horse-drawn vehicles or dangerous steamboats. 
 
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1891: CREATION OF COURTS OF APPEALS 
The relatively humble status of the Court began to change in 1891 when 
Congress created the Circuit Courts of Appeals to review most judgments of federal trial 
                                                 
34 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers 
Jurisprudence (1993);William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America 
(1996); Own Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888-1910 (1993). 
35 Christopher G. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States 162 (1890).   
36 An elaborate history of the practice is provided by Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and 
the History of Circuit Riding, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1753 (2003). 
37 The phrase was provided by Thomas Cooley, a Chief Justice of Michigan and the premier 
constitutionalist of the late nineteenth century.  On receiving an honorary degree from Harvard, he cautioned that: 
“the strength of law lies in its commonplace character, and it becomes feeble and untrustworthy when it expresses 
something different from the common thoughts of men.”  A Record of Commemoration, November 5 to November 9, 
1886, On the Two Hundred Fiftieth Anniversary of Harvard College 95 (1886). 
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courts.38  The purpose of the new law as proclaimed by its principal champion in the 
House of Representatives was to achieve “the overthrow and destruction of the kingly 
power” of the federal trial judges by subjecting them to closer appellate review than the 
one Supreme Court had provided.39  Prior to the Act, appeals had seldom been allowed 
in criminal cases (which were then few in number) or in civil cases involving lesser 
amounts (of which there were many).  In those matters, the trial court had the last and 
only say.  The Court after 1891 continued to hear some direct appeals from lower 
federal courts as well as from highest state courts, and entertained appeals from the 
intermediate appellate courts.  But the Justices were relieved of the odious duty of riding 
circuit.40 
The national economy emerging in the last decades of the nineteenth century 
brought with it the idea of human capitalism and admiration for all forms of expertise.  
Professional training became more highly valued in all fields of professional work, 41 not 
least including law, and became a major source of status in the middle class.42  The 
judiciary accordingly began to present themselves more as men of academic learning 
and less as men of proven political judgment.  The Court, and lower federal courts as 
well, would by the late twentieth century be all but divested of judges with experience as 
legislators or as candidates for any public office.43  They became more the instruments 
of a professional elite. 
And the notion that the law, even the Constitution, is a mystery requiring 
professional training to comprehend became increasingly fashionable.  Contrary to early 
nineteenth century practice in many states, bar organizations appeared; they 
                                                 
38 The story of the enactment is told by Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme 
Court 86-102 (1928). 
39 21 Cong Rec. 3403 (1890). 
40 It was essentially a “dead letter” by the time the statute was passed.  Frankfurter & Landis, supra n. 38 at 
87. 
41 Magali Larsen, The Rise of Professionalism (1977). 
42 Burton Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class in the Development of Higher 
Education 80-92 (1976). 
43 Sandra Day O’Connor was the one member of the Court over the last quarter century who had any 
experience as a legislator; she served briefly in the Arizona senate.  Her experience is recounted in Sandra Day 
O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of A Supreme Court Justice 106-107 (2003). 
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proclaimed and sometimes even sought to enforce standards of professional conduct 
for lawyers.44  The American Bar Association arose in 1878 as a voluntary association 
of elite lawyers with a broad agenda of law reforms.45  And university law schools 
materialized.46  Along with these developments came a growing sense on the part of the 
public and of Congress that judges were experts who should be trusted to do their work 
on their own terms, much as lawyers, doctors, engineers and public schoolteachers 
were then trusted to do their jobs as well as possible for the benefit of those they served 
with scant accounting for any mistakes they might make. 
To maintain their own professional standards and validate that growing trust, 
each justice came to need the help of a legal secretary or law clerk.  And they came 
generally to prefer young assistants certified by their law teachers to be individuals of 
uncommon intellect and energy.  This practice became the source of a stable 
relationship between the justices and the law professors at the schools from which the 
law clerks were drawn, but weakened ties among the justices.47 
 
PROGRESSIVE JUDICIAL LAW REFORM 
Then came the Progressive reform politics of 1900-1915, a development rooted 
in part in growing confidence in professional expertise as a confirmation of the 
Enlightenment notion that social problems can be solved by well-trained professionals.  
Roscoe Pound in 1906 famously expounded his “causes for popular dissatisfaction with 
the law” as including mindless technicalities that wise lawyers could eliminate.48  One 
Progressive campaign was an effort to improve the judiciary by means of “merit 
selection.”49  But it was also Progressive to assure the accountability of the judiciary for 
                                                 
44 Professions and Professional Ideologies in America (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983); The New High Priests: 
Lawyers in Post-Civil War America (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984). 
45 An account is Edson Sunderland, History of the American Bar Association and Its Work (1953). 
46 Robert Bocking Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (1983). 
47 Bradley J. Best, Law Clerks, Support Personnel, and the Decline of Consensual Norms on the United 
States Supreme Court 1935-1995 (2002). 
48 29 A. B. A. Rep. 503. 
49 Proposed by Albert Kales in 1914, it was first adopted in Missouri in 1940.  Maura Ann Schoshinski, 
Towards an Independent, Fair and Competent Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 839 (1994). 
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decisions laden with political consequences by means of constitutional referenda, recall 
elections and the like.50  And the professional training and status of judges were not 
deemed sufficient to justify conferring on them royal “life tenure” and the power to make 
almost irreversible political decisions.  These ideas did not, however, find their way into 
the federal government.51 
 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 
President Taft played an enormous role in the history of the Court and in the 
transformation of the entire federal judiciary.  He had been a federal judge and a law 
school dean in Cincinnati.52  While campaigning for the presidency in Pocatello, Taft 
uttered words foretelling his future role. “I love judges and I love courts,” he told the 
voters.  “They are my ideals.  They typify on earth what we shall meet hereafter in 
heaven under a just God.”53  During his four years as President, Taft had occasion to 
appoint no fewer than six members of the Supreme Court in whom he presumably 
detected a measure of divinity.  After losing the presidency in 1912, he moved to Yale 
and wrote about constitutional law, chiefly as it serves to constrain his successors in the 
White House.54 
 
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1922: CREATING THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
In 1921, President Harding appointed Taft chief justice to preside over the Court 
on which many of Taft’s own appointees sat.55  Among his first acts was to forsake the 
                                                 
50 For a contemporaneous expression of the Progressive view, see Gilbert E. Roe, Our Judicial Oligarchy 
(1912).  
51 Pound did express a vision of the role of federal as well as state appellate courts, see Paul D. Carrington, 
The Unknown Court, in Restructuring Justice (Arthur Hellman ed., 1990). 
52 1 Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (1939). On his appointment to the federal 
bench, see p. 95-96. On his time as dean, see 125.  
53 Jeffrey B. Morris, What Heaven Must Be Like: William Howard Taft as Chief Justice, 1921-30, 1983 
Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc. Y. B. 80, 82 (1983).  While President, Taft published an article on judicial administration, The 
Delays of the Law, 18 Yale L. J. 28 (1908). 
54 E.g., William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers (1916). 
 
55 See William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, 
8 A. B. A. J. 601 (1922).  Justice Frankfurter, no admirer of Taft’s politics, later noted, “there was no aspect of 
judicial reform which did not receive from him a ready response.”  Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 Va. L. Rev. 
883, 898 (1953).  On Taft’s leadership in the Court, see generally Robert Post, Judicial Management and Judicial 
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practice of abstaining from any effort to influence legislation in Congress, a practice 
established by John Marshall and followed by all of Taft’s predecessors.  Taft lobbied 
and soon secured enactment of the Judiciary Act of 192256 establishing the institution 
now known as the Judicial Conference of the United States.  The Conference is a low-
visibility council composed of chief judges of the federal circuits who acquire their status 
as chiefs on the basis of their seniority in service on their courts, and of other federal 
judges selected by their colleagues in the circuits or regions that they represent.  The 
Conference is chaired by the chief justice.  It was initially organized to study the needs 
of the courts and to report them to Congress.  By steps, the Conference acquired 
additional roles and was accorded increasing deference by Congress, with the result 
that the federal judiciary became substantially self-governing. 
In 1934, at the behest of the American Bar Association, Congress enacted the 
Rules Enabling Act57 commissioning the Supreme Court to propose rules of civil 
procedure for use in all federal trial courts, rules designated to become law if Congress 
did not timely override the proposals.  This was not a radical idea, but a Progressive 
one having antecedents in the longstanding practice of the federal courts in “suits in 
Equity.”58  Yet it was an exceptional delegation by Congress of explicitly legislative 
power to judges, power they had not previously exercised.  The Court turned to a 
special committee of fourteen eminent lawyers and scholars.  The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were published by the Court on the committee’s recommendation 
notwithstanding a dissent by Justice Brandeis,59 and were allowed by Congress to 
become law in 1938.  The new rules were not seen as beneficial to any identifiable 
                                                                                                                                                             
Disinterest: The Achievements and Perils of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, 1998 J. Sup. Ct. Hist 50; Robert 
Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship and Decisionmaking in the 
Taft Court, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1267 (2001);.and Kenneth W. Starr, William Howard Taft: The Chief Justice as 
Judicial Architect, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 963 (1992).  See generally Peter Graham Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial 
Administration (Princeton 1973). 
56 Act of September 14, 1922, 42 Stat. 837. 
57 Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064.  On its origins, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 
1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015 (1982). 
58 On the relation to practice in Equity, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1967). 
59 Edward Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the Politics of 
the Federal Courts in the Twentieth Century 135 (2000). 
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group of litigants but as an effective method of resolving disputed facts in accordance 
with the applicable law, and perhaps as a reflection of the Progressive goals proclaimed 
by Roscoe Pound and others.  They were deemed a great success by lawyers and trial 
judges, and were copied or emulated for use in the courts of most states.60  Less 
noticed was the degree to which the new rules enhanced the discretion and power of 
the individual trial judge.61 
In time, the committee that had advised the Court by drafting civil rules was 
replaced by one reporting to the Judicial Conference that in turn reports to the Court.62  
The new committee consisted mainly of federal judges counseled by a few lawyers and 
professors.  Whether this change was provident may be questioned.  But the 
Conference and its committees were then later empowered to recommend criminal 
rules, rules of evidence, bankruptcy rules and rules of appellate procedure.63  The 
Supreme Court has approved almost all the recommendations of the Conference and its 
advisory committees, and Congress has allowed almost all of them to become law. 64  
                                                 
60 Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Improving the Administration of Justice: Two Decades of Development, 26 Cin. L. 
Rev. 155 (1957); Geoffrey Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation, 87 Yale L. J. 1284, 1287 (1978). 
61 Stephen Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 631. 
62 Act of July 11, 1958, 72 Stat. 356. 
63 Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2071 were made by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act in 
1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title IV, § 403(a)(1)); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 was added by Judicial Improvements and 
Access to Justice Act in 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title IV, § 403(a)(1)), but was then amended by the Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title III, §§ 315, 321); 28 U.S.C. § 2073 was added by the 
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title IV, § 401(a)), and was then amended 
by the Bankruptcy Reform Act on Oct. 22, 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-394, Title I, § 104(e)); 28 U.S.C. § 2074 was 
added by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title IV, § 401(a)); 28 
U.S.C. § 2075 was added on Oct. 3, 1964 (Pub. L. No. 88-623, § 1, 78 Stat. 1001), and amended on November 6, 
1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title II, § 247, 92 Stat. 2672).  It was further amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994 (Pub. L. No. 103- 394, Title I, § 104(f)); 28 U.S.C. § 2076 was repealed in 1988 by Title IV of the Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act (Pub. L. No. 100-702).  The subject is now governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2072-2074; 28 U.S.C. § 2071 was added by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (Pub. L. No. 97-164, Title 
II, § 208(a)), and was amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act in 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-
702, Title IV, § 401(b)).  It was further amended by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-650, 
Title IV, § 406).   
64 For example, there was much controversy over the Federal Rules of Evidence when first promulgated; 
they were amended and, as amended, enacted by Congress but subject to revision by the procedure established 
pursuant to the 1934 scheme.  The story is told by Raymond F. Miller, Comment: Creating Evidentiary Privileges : 
An Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 771, 771-777 (1999). 
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While issues abide,65 most would concede that rulemaking by the Conference has been 
on balance a benign enterprise.  The committees have been careful to limit judicial 
rulemaking to procedural matters having no consciously substantive purpose, but the 
distinction between procedure and substance is not free of difficulty. 
Notwithstanding President Taft’s assessment of judges as angels of a sort, they 
do in their rulemaking manifest a tendency to confirm the “public choice theory” 
fashioned by academic economists to explain the tendency of lawmakers to take special 
care of their own interests as professionals.66  This is not to say that the federal judges 
are not committed to public service.  I can attest from decades of contact with scores of 
them, that they aspire to nothing but to do justice and maintain fidelity to law.  But when 
they come together on committees, those objectives tend to become conflated with the 
power and status of the judiciary.  It should surprise no one to hear that mortal judges 
are afflicted with very normal human failings, not unlike those manifested by other 
professionals, whether public or private.  
In 1939, the Conference was supplied with its own support staff by the creation of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.67  It served to displace an arm of 
the Department of Justice that had been performing that role.  One of its purposes was 
to enable the Conference to deal more directly with Congress in the pursuit of its 
legislative aims.68  The reform tended to relieve the Executive Branch of responsibility 
for issues of judicial administration. 
                                                 
65 For a current effort of a Congressman to amend Civil Rule 11, see <http://lamarsmith.house.gov/ 
news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=644>.  On the recent history of the rule, see Paul D. Carrington, & Andrew 
Wasson, A Reflection on Rulemaking: The Rule 11 Experience, 37 Loyola L. Rev.563 (2004). 
66 For an account of the theory, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A 
Critical Introduction (1991); on its application to the judiciary, see Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public 
Choice and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. Leg. Stud. 627 (1994); Charles G. Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradise Found: 
Redefining the Judiciary’s Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1165 (1996). 
67 Act of August 7, 1939, 53 Stat. 1223. 
68 Peter Graham Fish, Crises, Politics, and Federal Judicial Reform: The Administrative Office Act of 1939, 
32 J. Pol. 599 (1970). 
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On the advice of the Judicial Conference, Congress fashioned a generous 
retirement system for federal judges.69  This was done in part in response to knowledge 
of a growing number of superannuated trial judges whose lives were prolonged by 
twentieth century improvements in public health and whose impatience and arbitrary 
conduct at trials engendered the mistrust of lawyers and litigants.  Because the 
retirement plan allows them to retire at full pay, and because service on the lower 
federal courts is less gratifying than the exercise of the powers of a Justice, judges 
sitting on those courts retire after an appropriate period of service.70  Congress thus 
purchased an end to “life tenure” for district judges and circuit judges. 
Justices are afforded the same incentives to retire in a timely way as are the 
other Article III judges, but they do not choose to subside even though they could draw 
full pay without working.  Judith Resnik suggests that the benefits paid could be made to 
decline as judges overstay terms to be prescribed by Congress.71  Possibly Justices 
might be required to take their retirement after, say, eighteen years of service, or else 
forfeit the right to receive benefits thereafter. 
The Judicial Conference also persuaded Congress to add to the Conference’s 
broad legislative responsibility as procedural rulemaker, responsibilities for managing 
through its regional councils judicial misconduct resulting from physical or emotional 
disabilities.72  While only Congress with its impeachment power can remove a justice or 
any judge appointed by the President, a system of discipline was established within the 
Judicial Conference regime.  Its councils cannot remove any judge from office but it can 
terminate his or her authority to sit on cases.  This power is exercised with utmost, and 
perhaps excessive, caution or timidity, but it provides a humane method of dealing with 
emotional difficulties sometimes manifested by judges in their exercise of “kingly 
power.”  On occasion, judges disciplined by other judges have contested the 
                                                 
69 28 U.S.C. § 371 is based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 375 and 375a (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 260, 36 
Stat. 1161; Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 29, § 6, 40 Stat. 1157; Mar. 1, 1929, ch. 419, 45 Stat. 1422; Mar. 1, 1937, ch. 21 §§ 1, 
2, 50 Stat. 24; Feb 11, 1938, ch. 25, §1, 52 Stat. 28; May 11, 1944, ch. 192, §1, 58 Stat. 218). 
70 Albert Yoon, The End of the Rainbow: Understanding Turnover among Federal Judges, ___Am L. & 
Econ. Rev. ___, ___(forthcoming 2005). 
71 See Judith Resnik, So Long, Legal Affairs 20 (July/August 2005). 
72 Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 48 Fed. Reg. 30843, 28 
U.S.C. § 272. 
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constitutionality of this arrangement as constituting an exercise of power reserved by 
the Constitution to Congress as a part of its impeachment power, but without success.73  
By conferring this power on the Conference, Congress with the approval of the Court 
approved the idea that the “life tenure” of federal judges as prescribed in Article III could 
be forcibly constrained in appropriate circumstances without need to deploy the 
impeachment process. 
And also on the advice of the Conference, Congress in 1968 greatly enlarged the 
authority of lower federal courts to select and appoint additional judges who serve 
limited terms.74  By stages, the titles, roles, and compensations of magistrate judges 
and bankruptcy judges have been elevated.75  They are paid slightly less than the 
district judges appointed by the President, but they are authorized by Congress to 
exercise most of their courts’ powers.76 
The creation of these subordinate judgeships is in part a reflection of the Judicial 
Conference’s concerns for the number of Article III judges.  As the number of district 
and circuit judges increased in the twentieth century to handle increasing caseloads, 
some judges became concerned over the dilution of their status.  Federal judges might 
come to be seen as ordinary mortals and it might be harder to recruit the best and 
brightest.  A policy disfavoring new judgeships came to influence judicial rulemaking 
and administrative practices.77  In framing this policy, no account was taken of the 
relationship between the number of Article III judges and the number of lawyers over 
whom they preside or the populations they serve, nor of the comparison to other legal 
systems that employ proportionately many more judges, nor of the increasing number of 
individual substantive rights conferred on a growing population thereby increasing a 
                                                 
73 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970), see supra discussion in Cramton 
pp. ???-???. 
74 Act of Oct. 17, 1968, Pub. L. 90-578, Title I, § 101, 82 Stat. 1108 [enacting 28 U. S. C. § 631 et seq.].  
There were antecedent practices of a similar sort, especially in the administration of the bankruptcy laws. 
75 The title “Magistrate Judge” was conferred on magistrates in 1990.  The Judicial Improvements Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).  See generally Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts 
Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2131 (1989). 
76 The constitutional objections were dismissed.  United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Northern 
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 458 U. S. 50 (1982). 
77 Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 Harv. 
L. Rev. 924, 984-986 (2000).   
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demand for services in ever shorter supply.  No matter what the need, there can only be 
so many Article III judges! 
In sum, the Judicial Conference has come to bear some likeness to a labor 
union, one whose members are employed by an inattentive management that is 
Congress.  Or perhaps it is more a corporate culture led by executives enjoying utmost 
rewards in the form of political power but unnoticed by its shareholders who bear the 
consequences of those executive compensations.  This development was only indirectly 
the result of Chief Justice Taft’s initiative in 1922, but it reflected his zeal for the power 
and status of judges.  And Taft had other ideas as well. 
 
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1925: THE CERTIORARI POWER 
Taft’s 1922 Act was followed by the Judiciary Act of 1925, a law known at the 
time as “the judges bill.”78  It was responsive to a heavy caseload and backlog in the 
Court.  It authorized the Supreme Court to refuse to hear many of the cases brought to 
it, leaving unreviewed the merits of many cases decided by the federal courts of 
appeals or by highest state courts.  By stages, this discretion was extended to all cases.  
And so with trivial exceptions, the Court now decides only those cases it chooses to 
decide, and indeed only those issues raised in those cases that it deems worthy of its 
attention,79 no matter how critical other issues might be to the disposition of a case at 
hand. 
When Congress approved the 1925 Act, the Court was hearing about 330 cases 
a year, and deciding others without need of hearing.  Congress was assured that the 
number would not be substantially reduced and that the Court would separately confer 
on each denial of certiorari.80  In fact, the Court has now reduced its workload to about 
                                                 
78 Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936; on the legislative history, see Frankfurter & Landis, supra n. 38 
at 225-294 and Edward Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ 
Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1649-1704 (2000).  Hartnett also records later revisions expanding the power.  
Opposition was expressed by Senator Thomas J. Walsh (D.–Mont.).  See his The Overburdened Supreme Court, 
1922 Va. Bar Assn Rep. 216. 
79 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1251 et seq. 
80 The then Solicitor General, James M. Beck, testifying on behalf of the legislation at Taft’s request, 
“estimated that the number of cases of public gravity that the Court could decide on the merits was between four 
hundred and five hundred [per year].  Hartnett, supra n. 78 at 1646. 
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seventy-five cases a year and declines to consider the other thousands in which its 
review is sought.81  The seventy-five are presumably the most important, or at least 
present the most important issues, but it is not always clear that this is so.82  The 
Court’s own rule purporting to set standards for selecting cases is “hopelessly 
indeterminate and unilluminating.”83  Justices seldom explain their reasons for declining 
to review a case.  That those reasons are of a diverse political nature and sometimes 
centered on the interests of the federal judiciary, is not to be doubted.84  This power to 
select the cases it decides is transformative.  With rare exception, the Court only agrees 
to hear cases that present the justices with opportunities to legislate on questions they 
deem worthy of their attention.  Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist has urged the Court to 
retain jurisdiction over moot cases if they present interesting and important legal issues; 
the Court should not, in his view, be deprived of an opportunity to legislate merely 
because the parties have settled their case and are no longer available to argue it.85   
It is quite plausible that the power of the Court over its agenda gave it the 
courage to extend the federal Constitution to matters that had previously been regarded 
as matters of state law.  It was a very short time after passage of the 1925 Act that the 
Court re-interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment so that almost all the protections of the 
Bill of Rights applied to the states and thus empowered itself to review a vast array of 
state court decisions.86  As Edward Hartnett observes, it is difficult to imagine the Court 
publishing an opinion making new constitutional law such that all persons convicted of 
crime by state courts would become entitled to invoke Supreme Court jurisdiction as a 
matter of federal right.  Concentrating on its legislative role, the Court leaves to lower 
courts narrow concerns about whether specific cases were rightly decided on the facts 
                                                 
81 2003 Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.  A review of the 2003 year 
is available at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf> at p. 9. 
82 See Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rules 10-16. 
83 Samuel Estreicher & John Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: An 
Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681, 790 (1994). 
84 For accounts, see Richard L. Pacelle Jr., The Transformation of the Supreme Court’s Agenda: From the 
New Deal to the Reagan Administration (1991); H. W. Perry Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United 
States Supreme Court (1991); Doris Marie Provine, Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court (1980). 
85 Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 205, 329-330 (1988). 
86 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925). 
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and the law.  In the mode thus established, the Court does still decide cases, but only 
incidentally to its lawmaking.  In this respect, it has turned on its head the judicial role 
envisioned by the Founders. 
An indirect consequence of this arrangement is the nullification of the argument 
made by Chief Justice Marshall in his celebrated opinion in Marbury v. Madison87 
justifying the Court’s role in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.  He explained 
that role as necessitated by its duty to decide the cases brought to it for decision—it 
could neither refuse to decide nor could it disobey the Constitution.  But the Court no 
longer has any such duty to decide a case.  And it seldom finds it necessary to decide 
whether in a specific case the lower courts have actually and correctly applied the 
controlling law. 
While the workload of the justices was thus steadily declining after 1925, they 
were being supplied with more and more help.  To help decide seventy-five cases a 
year, and write eight or so opinions of the Court proclaiming the law to be applied in the 
future by other lesser courts, each justice is supplied with very bright and energetic law 
clerks.  Their number has been by stages increased from one per justice to four.88  This 
help is employed in different ways by different justices.  But it has enabled some to go 
on automatic pilot, delegating much of their work to assistants.89  And a similar 
development has occurred in the lower federal courts, where, along with the addition of 
magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges has come a substantial increase in the staff of 
law clerks and staff attorneys.  There, too, the delegation of power and responsibility is 
much greater than it was in the time when Louis Brandeis could boast of the Court:  “We 
do our own work.”90 
Just as the Supreme Court focuses its energy on only a few of the matters on 
which its attention is requested, a similar concentration of effort has occurred in the 
lower federal courts.  A half century ago, as the authors of the Judiciary Act of 1891 
                                                 
87 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-178 (1803). 
88 L. A. Powe, Jr., Go Geezers Go: Leaving the Bench, 25 Law and Social Inquiry 1227 (2000). 
89 David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U. S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th 
Amendment, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 995 (2000). 
90 Bernard Schwartz, Decision 48 (1996).  
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envisioned, every litigant in a federal appellate court was assured of the right to an oral 
hearing at which the three judges responsible for the decision would appear in person 
and engage in discourse with counsel to appraise critically the judgment of the court 
under review.91  And in due course, the judges hearing the case would publish a 
decision justifying their action and incidentally giving evidence of their personal attention 
to the parties’ contentions.  Those amenities have vanished in many cases.   
It ought to be conceded that one reason for this abandonment of appellate 
procedure has been the duty imposed on federal courts to entertain many appeals 
presenting no serious issues.  These include many routine appeals in criminal cases, or 
from denials of petitions by prisoners seeking belatedly to challenge their convictions 
whether in state or federal court, or civil claims of prisoners seeking to gain some 
improvement in the conditions of their incarceration.  The abrupt procedure of the courts 
of appeals in such cases resembles that of the Supreme Court. 
But similar change is also seen in the handling of many other cases in which 
lawyers have appealed from questionable fact findings or procedural rulings and are 
making arguments that speak to important rights and interests of the parties but that 
have little resonance in other cases.  Such cases present the circuit judges and their 
law clerks no opportunity to expound the national law.  Instead of providing hearings 
and decisions in such humdrum cases, circuit judges are prone, like justices, to 
concentrate their efforts on making “the law of the circuit.”  Time and energy are 
invested in writing learned opinions justifying a new legal principle.  Those resources 
are also invested in en banc proceedings and in deciding when such proceedings ought 
to be deemed necessary to assure that all the judges in a circuit are making the same 
federal law.92  Oral arguments are often unavailable.  Only opinions of the legislative 
sort are generally published.  Less interesting cases are often left to law clerks or staff 
attorneys whose memoranda are simply endorsed by the circuit judges.  Circuit judges 
have proposed that they be given discretion, similar to that conferred on the Supreme 
                                                 
91 The decline of the institution of oral argument was marked by Charles Haworth, Screening and Summary 
Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 Wash. U. L. Q. 257. 
92 On the frailties of the “law of the circuit,” see Paul D. Carrington, The Obsolescence of the United States 
Court of Appeals, 15 J. Law & Politics 515 (1999). 
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Court, to decline to hear on the merits those appeals deemed by them to be unworthy of 
close attention by important judges responsible for articulating the law of the circuit.93  
The argument made for that reform is that it would make the law conform to reality. 
But it bears notice that the law of the circuit, in contrast to the law made by the 
Supreme Court, receives virtually no academic attention and only very occasional study 
by appellate advocates.  The reason is that the law of the circuit is necessarily tentative, 
depending as it does on the absence of any later relevant utterance by the Supreme 
Court or by Congress or, indeed, the Executive Branch.  And it is in some measure 
illusory:  the empirical data suggest that even other judges sitting on the same circuit 
court of appeals, do not take the law of the circuit very seriously.94  But like justices, 
circuit judges and their young law clerks are attracted to the making of authoritative 
utterances presuming to command the acceptance of their readers.  If their readers are 
few, well the same can be said for academic publications.  In this sense, the Federal 
Reporter containing the published opinions of the courts of appeals can be regarded as 
just a special sort of academic law review.  Meanwhile, many litigants seeking the 
attention of United States circuit judges are receiving very little of it. 
A similar transformation has occurred in the federal district courts.  Trials at 
which adversaries present evidence have become rare events in federal courts.95  
Instead the district judges and their staffs engage in “managerial judging,”96 a process 
by which they seek to facilitate settlements and avoid the necessity of making decisions 
that might burden the court of appeals with the need to review their judgments; or, if a 
decision must be made, to render it in the form of a summary judgment, ruling one 
                                                 
93 E.g., Robert M. Parker & Ron Chapman, Accepting Reality: The Time for Accepting Discretionary 
Review in the Courts of Appeals Has Arrived, 50 S.M.U. L. Rev. 573 (1997); Public Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeal, Apr. 24, 1998 (statement of Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, U.S. 
Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit.  But see Richard S. Arnold, The Future of the Federal Courts, 60 Mo. L. Rev. 
540 (1995).  
94 Mitu Gulati & C. M. A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61-3 L. & Contemp. Probs. 157 (1998). 
95 See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Leg. Studies 459 (2004). 
96 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and 
Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982 (2003);.Judith 
Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in 
Courts, 1 J. Empirical Leg. Studies 783 (2004); Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We 
Paid For, and Not Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. Empirical Leg. Studies 943 (2004). 
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party’s proffered evidence to be legally insufficient and hence unworthy of being 
heard,97 a procedure that spares the trial judge the need to see and hear witnesses and 
enables him or her to elaborate the controlling law.  And it eliminates the exposure of 
the judge to contact with actual litigants or jurors.  That tendency to employ summary 
judgment was much encouraged by a trilogy of Supreme Court opinions published in 
1986 that enlarged the application of the governing rule without modifying its text.98  The 
tendency was further encouraged by a second trilogy of cases empowering judges, 
again without modifying the Federal Rule of Evidence governing such rulings, to 
exclude proffered expert testimony that they deemed to be inadequately based in 
science, a discipline of which few judges are masters.  And the Court proclaimed such 
rulings to be subject to review in the courts of appeals only for “abuse of discretion.”99  
So empowered, district judges are able to make pretrial dispositions of most of the 
cases on their docket.  Why, Judge Patrick Higginbotham has asked, do we still call 
them trial judges?100   
His question might be extended—why do we call any of them judges or justices 
when they spend most of their time legislating?  That would be unduly harsh.  Federal 
judges and justices do still decide cases.  But it does appear that the preoccupation of 
the justices with the few cases most suited to their attentions as lawmakers has trickled 
down to lower federal courts that are also increasingly selective in how they choose to 
invest their efforts.  Implicit in the change is a disregard for the tasks of resolving issues 
of fact and hearing the claims and concerns of mere individual litigants.101 
Meanwhile, as the justices’ staffs have enlarged and their docket has fallen, the 
Supreme Court’s calendar has steadily shrunk.  The justices take leave for a month in 
                                                 
97 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil 
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. Empirical Leg. Studies 597 (2004). 
98 The cases and reactions to them are recounted in Paul D. Carrington, Exorcising the Bogy of Non-
Transsubstantive Rules and Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2067 
(1989). 
99 The cases are briefly reviewed in Paul D. Carrington & Traci Jones, Reluctant Experts, 59-4 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 101 (1997). 
100 So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts, 55 S.M.U. L. Rev. 1405 (2002). 
101 There may also be a growing problem of lower court judges seeking promotions to higher courts; Guido 
Calabresi suggests that this development is a threat to judicial independence.  The Current Subtle—and Not So 
Subtle—Rejection of an Independent Judiciary, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 637 (2002). 
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the winter and two months in the summer.  During those times, they travel, write 
books,102 and engage in other diversions.  At all times of the year, and wherever they 
go, they are feted.  When one considers the life style of the justices, it is little wonder 
that they are disinclined to subside from their high office.  The extent to which a similar 
improvement in life style has occurred for other federal judges is less visible. 
 
TAFT’S COURTHOUSE ARCHITECTURE 
Yet another source of judicial grandeur was provided by Chief Justice Taft’s third 
legislative initiative, which was to seek and secure Congressional appropriation for the 
Supreme Court’s building.  It is easily the most elegant structure in Washington and 
reflects Taft’s sense of the divinity of justices.  It is a magnificent Greek temple.  Justice 
Brandeis protested that it made his colleagues into “the nine beetles of the Temple of 
Karnak” and would cause them to have an inflated vision of themselves.103  Does 
working as a celebrity in such an environment for decades affect the state of mind of 
justices?  Infuse them with notions of grandeur and indispensability?  Informed 
observers of the Court report that numerous justices serving on the Court in the 
twentieth century have undergone personal transformations while on the Court that 
have resulted in policy decisions in many of their most important cases quite different 
from those anticipated by those responsible for their appointments.  It is on this point 
that concern for superannuation is most closely linked to the concern over hubris and 
excess that is the subject of this essay.  Elementary common sense tells us that a 
person working for decades on end in such an environment is almost doomed to lose 
any modesty or sense of proportion he or she might still have retained at the time of 
confirmation. 
Judith Resnik has expressed similar concerns about the wave of more recent 
federal courthouses in which subordinate federal judges sit and work.  Many of them are 
                                                 
102 E.g. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s books are The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is (1987); How 
Grand Inquests: The Impeachments of Justice Samuel Case and President Andrew Johnson (1992); All the Laws But 
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1876 (2004). 
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Crisis, 29 J. S. Ct. Hist. 163 (2004). 
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designed around some of the institutional reforms crafted by the Judicial Conference 
involving staff enlargements and the diminished likelihood of trial.104  Their work 
environment, too, does tend to shape their sense of what it is they are expected to do. 
 
THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT OF 1932 
A belated piece of Progressive legislation was enacted by Congress in 1932 on 
the eve of the coming of the New Deal.  The law enacted was a signal example of a 
wise if belated Congressional response to overreaching by the federal judiciary.  As 
noted, the Supreme Court began in the nineteenth century to invalidate state laws 
enacted to protect industrial workers.  Contemporaneous with that Gilded Age 
development was the emergence of the strike-breaking injunction issued by lower 
federal courts.  Congress did not by legislation authorize this practice.  One legal theory 
justifying the practice that Circuit Judge Taft had been among the first to advance was 
that the courts had implied authority to prevent interference with interstate commerce.  
The import of Taft’s opinion explaining his injunction against a rail strike was “that no 
interference with interstate commerce is ever justifiable.”105  Such an injunction was 
very effective in breaking strikes, in part because it was a quick response to a walkout, 
forcing workers back into their plants.  So the strike was very likely to be broken at once 
even if it might later be concluded that a permanent injunction would be inappropriate.  
The Supreme Court was seldom involved in these matters, but it did in 1895 affirm the 
conviction of union leader Eugene Debs for his failure to get his members back to work, 
thereby defying a federal court order, notwithstanding the fact that the injunction lacked 
the sanction of any federal law.106  By one count, federal judges imposed over 4,300 
injunctions on unions between 1880 and 1930.107 
In 1932, after the death of Chief Justice Taft and his replacement by the 
Progressive Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the American Federation of Labor at 
last secured legislative relief from this longstanding practice of federal courts.  The Act 
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simply withdrew federal jurisdiction in cases in which employers sought injunctive 
relief.108 
 
COURT-PACKING 
In 1937, not long after the Court moved into its temple, there came the Court-
packing incident. 109  There was reason for the Roosevelt administration to fear that the 
Court might invalidate much of its legislative program.  To prevent that, the President 
proposed to increase the size of the Court by six justices.  This was precisely the 
remedy prescribed by Professor Tiedemann, the constitutionalist of the Gilded Age, and 
the remedy employed on a modest scale by President Lincoln.  The proposal was 
widely supported by the law professors of the day.  Thurman Arnold suggested that the 
Court should modify its invocation from “God save the Government of the United States 
and this Honorable Court” to “God save the United States or this Court,” because God 
could not possibly do both and should be given His choice.110  The organized bar was, 
however, most vocal in its opposition to the presidential scheme, confirming a 
connection in the minds of bar leaders between the reverence for the principle of judicial 
independence and the profession’s self-respect.  The profession is in a sense a 
fraternity of which the judicial fraternity is a subset, and in that instance the American 
Bar Association marshaled a lot of public support for its brothers.  That daunting force is 
likely one reason Congress has neglected its duty to govern the federal courts, for there 
is no rival part of its political constituency with as important a stake in issues of judicial 
administration as that of the organized bar. 
The threat of the Court-packing plan appears to have enabled the Progressive 
Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes, to restrain his judicial brethren so that no 
enduring harm was done by the Court to the New Deal.111  But the President did not 
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withdraw his proposal, and it was in due course defeated in Congress.  The event was 
in time taken as a signal victory of the Court and the legal profession over the Executive 
Branch. 
 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
The Court’s sense of its grandeur was further enhanced by its experience with 
civil rights.  The Court had earlier declined to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment 
guarantee of an equal right to vote112 and it was very slow to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment for the benefit of those whom it was ratified to protect.  But its 1954 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education113 was a great moment in American law.  It 
inspired a generation of young lawyers to think of constitutional law as a great 
instrument for social reform.  While many billboards called for the impeachment of Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, those calls were widely rejected.114  But they led to the 
confrontation in Little Rock in 1956 when President Eisenhower, on the advice of 
Attorney General Brownell, sent in the 101st Airborne Division to secure the place of 
nine African American students in Central High School.115  Judges of lower rank were at 
times in physical danger; an airborne division was not required for their protection, but 
there was cause to celebrate their heroism.116 
A consequence of the invasion of Little Rock was that justices began to think of 
themselves as commanding a great military force.  In the Little Rock case, they were 
moved to declare that mere state officials were not entitled to read the Constitution for 
themselves to justify their protests, but were bound to accept whatever meaning of the 
constitutional text that they, the justices, might determine and that a failure of state 
officials to do so would be a violation of their oaths of office. 117  The Court thus implied 
that state officials should be removed from office merely for their disagreement with the 
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Court.  The language of the opinion had equal application to the President, members of 
Congress and other federal government officials, who were thus cautioned against 
reading the Constitution for themselves.  Indeed, as Philip Kurland asked,118 if an 
opinion of the Court is so immutable, how could the Court defy its own dictum in Plessy 
v. Ferguson?119 
That the Court played an important role in the civil rights struggles that continued 
for two decades is not to be doubted.  But neither should it be forgotten that many 
others played important roles in the cause.120  While its decisions evoked rage, they 
also commanded vast popular support created by the efforts of many others over a 
much longer period of time.  And the decisive role was played not by the Court but by 
Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that enabled the Department of 
Justice to play a leading role in bringing force to bear where it was needed.  The courts’ 
legal opinions changed few minds.121 
 
JUDICIAL DECREES TO CHANGE SOCIETY 
By 1961, the Court, with self-confidence enlarged by the consequences of the 
several judiciary acts, its semi-divine surroundings, and its then recent history in 
achieving social change, was prepared to take on numerous other assignments.  Under 
the intellectual and political leadership of Justice William Brennan, it took on the job of 
making America more humane by proclaiming new constitutional rights.  Such rights 
were not to be found in the explicit text of the Constitution, but in principles of natural 
law said to be implied in the text, discerned by judges, and then elaborated in their 
opinions of the court.  Levinson has observed that many lawyers and legal scholars 
came increasingly during this time to think of the constitutional text in the way that the 
Catholic Church has traditionally thought of scripture, as a text truly understood only by 
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those professionally invested in its interpretation.122  Mere literates were told to keep 
their thoughts to themselves.  This form of religiosity was also perhaps traceable to the 
English common law tradition that Lord Coke explained to King James, defining the law 
as a subject accessible only to initiates and quite beyond the understanding of a mere 
royal.123  Chief Justice Taft expressed the thought thusly: “The people at the polls, no 
more than kings upon the throne are fit to pass upon questions involving the judicial 
interpretation of the law.” 124  And so a statue of Lord Coke stands in his Greek temple. 
As noted, The Federalist 78 defined the political role of the Court as one of 
slowing the process of legislation by providing a cautionary restraint on representative 
government.  Ward Farnsworth invokes this notion as a justification for maintaining the 
extended terms of senior justices better to link the future to the past.125  Justice Robert 
Jackson regretted that linkage, noting that it is usually “the check of a preceding 
generation on the present one,” and “nearly always the check of a rejected regime on 
the one in being.”126   
But in the decades since 1960, it has been the Court more often than Congress 
that has been out in front with its political agenda.  With the encouragement of many 
lawyers and academics, it has become a primary source of major legislative change.  It 
seemed at times that the Court was more effective than the Kennedy or Johnson 
administrations in the pursuit of similar political aims, despite the fact that the Court led 
by Justice Brennan was in form merely reacting to disputes brought to its attention by 
litigants. 
On the other hand, it seems that few if any of the reforms effected through the 
application of constitutional law by the federal courts have worked as well as was 
hoped, or as they seemed to promise to those who approved them.  The Court did, with 
the help of Congress and the Department of Justice, put an end to de jure segregation 
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(no small achievement), but, alas, racial and ethnic isolation in public schools resulting 
from residential isolation and the departure of advantaged children from the public 
schools has resulted in much re-segregation that it seems fruitless to prohibit.127 
In the 1960s, the Court became increasingly receptive to petitions by persons 
convicted of crime and by prisoners.  Over the years Court decisions established a large 
and complex regime of constitutional criminal procedure.  Numerous new procedural 
requirements on criminal prosecutions were intended to protect defendants from 
investigative and prosecutorial abuse and to prevent the conviction of the innocent.  The 
Court also embarked the lower federal courts on the mission of correcting the worst 
abuses of prisoners in state prisons.  
It seems certain that there is less police brutality, and fewer convictions of the 
innocent, and less gruesome treatment of prisoners than there would have been had 
the Court remained as politically docile as it had been in its first century.  Perhaps in this 
respect the justices have at least partially redeemed the promise uttered on the face of 
their temple: “Equal Justice Under Law.”  There are, however, now two million persons 
serving sentences in American prisons (more perhaps than in all the rest of the world) 
and their sentences—negotiated by prosecutors and defense counsel among 
alternatives presented by ever more severe criminal codes—seem to result in ever 
longer prison terms.  The rise of plea bargaining has now led to efforts of the 
Department of Justice and some legislators to try to intimidate with possible 
impeachment federal judges whose sentences are deemed short and thus a restraint on 
the bargaining power of prosecutors.  Those efforts are a genuine threat to the judicial 
independence Article III is intended to protect, giving rise to concern properly expressed 
by the American Bar Association128 and other professional organizations. 
The Court chose to review capital cases and seemed for a time to have 
abolished capital punishment by imposing procedural requirements that had not been 
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met by state courts in reaching capital sentences.  But this evoked bitter responses in 
many states.129  New procedures were devised to meet the new requirements, and 
capital punishment may even have become more frequent as a result of the reforms 
that separated consideration of guilt from consideration of punishment.130  It is, 
however, still a topic in litigation in the Supreme Court.  The institution of capital 
punishment remains deeply rooted in the culture of many states.131 
The Court also chose to review an array of cases presenting arguments for the 
application of the First Amendment by petitioners seeking to override state or local laws 
or practices as unlawful inhibitions of freedom of speech or religion. 132  Many 
arguments for individual rights prevailed in the Court, but engendered resentment by 
those identifying themselves as a “moral majority.”  In the school prayer cases, the 
Court may simply have mandated a revival of nineteenth century practices in most 
states, practices that strictly protected religious dissidents from forced conformity.  But it 
was on softer ground less sustained by tradition when it suppressed laws against 
pornography. 
And it was on very soft ground indeed when it invoked the First Amendment 
along with the Equal Protection Clause to restructure the American political system.  
“One man, one vote,” sounded nice, but created worse problems than it solved by 
disconnecting representatives from the geographical units with which their constituents 
identified and commissioning diverse partisan officials to adjust district boundaries not 
only to equalize their populations, but to fit their own partisan aims.133  The Court then 
                                                 
129 The story is well told in Lee Epstein & Joseph F. Kobylka, The Supreme Court and Legal Change: 
Abortion and the Death Penalty 34-136 (1992). 
130 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355 (1995). 
131 See generally, The Killing State: Capital Punishment in Law, Politics, and Culture (Austin Sarat ed., 
New York 1999), and especially Franklin E, Zimring, The Executioner’s Dissonant Song: On Capital Punishment 
and American Legal Values, id. at 137. 
132  See Richard H. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to 
Bush v. Gore (2004). 
 
133 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) was the case holding that a state constitution providing an upper 
house in the legislature seating representatives from each county was trumped by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  On the current state of the issue, see Daniel Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459 
(2004); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 
 31
went on to constitutionalize the right of those with wealth to use their money to dominate 
political discourse in ways facilitated by the advent of television and the spot 
commercial.134  “Money is speech?”  And then to strip “public figures” such as 
candidates of effective protection against defamatory advertising,135 even in some 
circumstances anonymous defamation.136  These law reforms were wrought by justices, 
seeking to act—I do not doubt—entirely in the public interest, but as (now Judge) 
Michael McConnell concluded: 
The landscape of American politics today is not an encouraging sight.  All 
too many Americans have come to the conclusion that elections do not 
matter.  Incumbency retention levels rival the most undemocratic regimes 
of the world.  Partisanship and attack politics are the name of the game.  
Racial appeals abound.  It is fair to say that the responsibility for a great 
deal of the political problem is to be laid at the feet of the Supreme Court’s 
well-meaning reforms from the early 1960s.137 
It was a fitting confirmation of that reality when a majority of the Court in 2000 
decided the presidential election by usurping the roles of the electoral college and the 
House of Representatives, notwithstanding the text of the Constitution plainly written to 
exclude the justices from any role in the selection of the President who selects their 
colleagues. 138  It could not be viewed as incidental that the five prevailing justices 
picked the presidential candidate more likely to select future justices who would share 
their views and help make more law meeting with the approval of the five. 
Then the Court, having restructured the schools, the prisons, and most other 
public institutions brought to its attention, commenced to try to tell the people not only 
how to govern themselves but what to believe about grave moral issues of religious 
import to many citizens.  To decide the constitutionality of the Texas law prohibiting 
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abortions, the Court consulted medical experts for help in codifying principles of medical 
law it discerned beneath the text of the Constitution.139  With its opinion legislating in 
detail the woman’s right to choose, the Court not only presumed to leave few choices to 
be made by elected representatives, but it treated the religious faith of many citizens as 
undeserving of notice.  At the time of the decision, there was a clearly discernible 
movement among state legislatures to enlarge the freedom of a woman to make the 
choice for herself.  Some states were even appropriating money to fund free abortions 
in the hope that this would diminish the need for welfare funds. 
But then came the Right to Life Movement.140  It seems clear that the movement 
gained much energy from the reaction of adherents of religious faiths.  These were 
people who received the Court’s opinion on abortion rights as an evil manifestation of 
Godlessness and an insult to their religious faith.  The intensity of their reaction seems 
not to have been diminished by the Court’s later reconsideration of the issue in an 
opinion that observed its prior decision was supported by “the thoughtful part of the 
nation.”141  At least partly as a consequence of the Court’s political misjudgment in 
making elaborate law repudiating their faith, and the great difficulty to be encountered in 
any effort to overrule it by constitutional amendment, religious fundamentalists have 
become a major force in our national, state, and local politics.  And it may now be 
harder for a woman to get an abortion in some communities than it was before the Court 
declared her right to do so. 
And the reaction is directed at the selection and confirmation of justices and 
other federal judges, thereby diminishing public interest and awareness of the politics of 
foreign relations and the national economy that are vital issues exclusively of concern to 
the federal government and its elected officers.  It is reasonable to believe that the 
Court’s decision on the right to abortion controlled the outcome of presidential elections 
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in 1980, 1988, and 2000, and has had a political impact even larger than those data 
might suggest.142 
The Court was more cautious in telling people what to believe about 
homosexuality.143  Attitudes and values bearing on that subject have changed across 
the land over the last three decades or so, although more in some areas than others.  
But the Court’s more recent decision to take on the issue to the extent of invalidating 
criminal laws prohibiting homosexual acts144 did serve further to excite the hostility of 
religious fundamentalists.  It helped provide the occasion for placing on the ballot in 
twenty-five states referenda asking voters to express a view on the meaning of the word 
“marriage.”145  Because that device brought to the polls many citizens who would 
otherwise not have voted, it very likely determined the outcome of the presidential 
election of 2004.  Whatever the word “marriage” may ultimately be allowed to mean, 
there remains an apparent tendency of the American public to become increasingly 
tolerant of sexual activities that previous generations proscribed.  But it is unlikely that 
the pace of change on such issues will be significantly accelerated by any words uttered 
in the form of an opinion of the Court.  People may observe laws with which they 
disagree, but few will change their views about sexual behavior on the advice of judges 
and lawyers.  They may listen to those whom they choose, but seldom to those who 
seek to impose their opinions on moral questions even when they invoke constitutional 
law embodied in judicial precedents. 
In delving into such matters, the Court has quite possibly caused poor Chief 
Justice Taft to roll in his grave in distress at the substance of what he wrought.  For 
myself, I have no problems with the individual rights the Court has sought to create; if 
we were senators together in the same state legislature, I would vote with William 
Brennan on those issues almost every time.  But the Court has thus contributed to a 
                                                 
142 See generally William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 391 (2002). 
143 For a salute to their caution see Paul D. Carrington, A Senate of Five, 23 Geo. L. Rev. 859 (1989). 
144 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003). 
145 Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, Stateline.org <http://www.nationalcoalition. 
org/legal/50staterundown.html> (July 8, 2004, last visited July 28 2005).  Twenty-five states proposed constitutional 
amendments. 
 
 34
dangerous sense of alienation of many citizens sharing traditional moral and religious 
views on pornography, abortion, capital punishment, and gay rights that they are 
powerless to express by ordinary democratic political discourse, perhaps especially not 
given the ugly political system that the Court has crafted to the despair of Judge 
McConnell and this author.146 
 
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION TO ACCOMMODATE JUDGES 
The Court’s ascendance over Congress and state legislatures is not restricted to 
its interpretations of the Constitution.  As Frederick Grimké long ago explained, 
bicameral legislatures, including Congress often have difficulty in agreeing on legislative 
texts that resolve even the most obvious conflicts certain to arise in their enforcement.  
And they are inevitably slow to correct oversights or misunderstandings manifested 
years after their enactments.  These realities often leave much room for elaboration in 
opinions of courts that may be transformative. 
But acts of Congress did not become frequent subjects of judicial interpretation 
until the advent of a troubled national economy inspired federal legislation.  And it was 
not until the New Deal that Congress presented the Court with a vast array of laws 
requiring judicial elaboration and illumination.  Often thereafter the Court would resort to 
committee reports and even speeches of legislators to establish the intent and meaning 
of federal laws.147  But it became apparent that such material was frequently available 
on all sides of a question; it has been said that judges reading legislative history are 
standing on a balcony and looking into a crowd in search of a friendly face. 
As the Court and the lower federal courts became more heavily engaged in the 
elevated and gratifying task of writing opinions interpreting statutes, they also 
sometimes again manifested the tendency observed by public choice theorists.148  Their 
decisions, although written with utmost integrity, tended to express policies favoring the 
interests of judges in their collective status and power.  Sometimes judge-made policies 
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even defeated the policies expressed in Congressional legislation.  And sometimes 
Congress took no notice. 
I offer three examples.  The first pertains to the size of juries in civil cases in the 
federal courts.  By the year 1300, it was settled that a common law jury seated twelve 
citizens.  That was a good number—sufficient to distribute responsibility for verdicts 
across a segment of the public but small enough to provide jurors with a sense of 
personal responsibility.  Many changes were effected in the conduct of jury trials over 
six or seven centuries, but the number twelve did not change.  When the Seventh 
Amendment provided that the right to trial by jury “in suits at common law” “shall be 
preserved,” that was taken to mean that a citizen contesting a case in a federal court 
had a right to demand that issues of fact be decided by twelve citizens drawn from the 
community.  Indeed, if anyone questioned the number twelve as implicit in the text of 
the Amendment, there seems to be no record of the debate. 
And in 1968 Congress enacted legislation governing the selection of the jurors to 
assure that the twelve would fairly reflect the racial and ethnic composition of the district 
from which it was selected. 149  The Congressional assumption of the number twelve 
was embodied in the rules limiting the number of objections a party could make to the 
seating of individual jurors.  That number is three.  That number allows a party to 
exclude from a jury individuals whom that party mistrusts for whatever reason.  But it is 
not large enough to allow a party often to be able to influence materially the race, class, 
or ethnicity of those who will decide his case.  The same assumption of the number 
twelve was explicit in Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing a 
verdict by a number less that twelve but with consent of the parties.150 
Soon after the statute was enacted, some federal judges decided that trials 
would be easier to conduct if juries were reduced by half.  A district judge in Montana 
simply announced a local rule that in his court juries would be six.  Never mind seven 
centuries of tradition, or the assumptions implicit in the text of the Seventh Amendment 
and the law enacted by Congress, or explicit in the text of the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure.  And the Supreme Court upheld the local rule, allowing it to spread to most 
other district courts.151  Justice Thurgood Marshall in dissent accurately assessed the 
decision as “not some minor tinkering with the role of the civil jury, but with its wholesale 
abolition and replacement with a different institution which functions differently, 
produces different results, and was wholly unknown to the Framers of the Seventh 
Amendment.”152 
Justice Marshall’s assessment was soon confirmed by experience.  Smaller 
juries are much more likely to be exotic in their demographic composition, in part 
because of random effect and in part because lawyers have much greater influence 
over the selection.  Smaller juries are much more likely to be dominated by a single 
strong-minded juror.  For these reasons, the verdicts of smaller juries are materially 
harder to predict.  This is likely to be one reason that civil trials are vanishing from 
federal courts—prudent parties are risk averse.  Very few kind words have been uttered 
in defense of the six-person jury by lawyers or scholars, but Congress has left the 
matter to the Judicial Conference.  In 1995, the Judicial Conference Committee on the 
Civil Rules proposed a rule amendment returning the jury to twelve.153  Although 
supported by a careful review of the data demonstrating the improvidence of the 
change, the proposal was summarily rejected by the Judicial Conference.  Congress 
has never considered the proper size of a jury. 
A second example of free-wheeling self-dealing by the Supreme Court is its 1991 
holding that a federal district judge has “inherent power” to impose the costs borne by 
an adversary on a litigant whose lawyer was said to act “in bad faith.”154  What made 
this decision remarkable was the existence of a federal law imposing consequences on 
“vexatious litigants”155 and of an elaborate provision in the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure authorizing judges to impose cost sanctions on lawyers who are guilty of 
presenting groundless claims or defenses resulting in costs to an adversary.156  Neither 
the statute nor the rule of court authorized the judge to do what he did in the case 
before the Court.  Well, never mind the legal texts; if it seems right, the judge should do 
it even without explicit authority in the law.  Again, Congress has taken no notice but 
has left the matter entirely to the judges.   
My third and most consequential example is the violence done by the Supreme 
Court to the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. 157  The Act was written to apply to 
contracts between businessmen engaged in interstate transactions and validates 
clauses providing for private arbitration of future disputes between the parties.158  If 
businessmen so agree, their contract rights can be fairly determined by an arbitrator 
because, indeed, their contract rights are whatever the arbitrator decides that they are.   
In the American tradition, arbitrators are not bound by the law but can do 
whatever seems to them right and fair.159  They may choose to hear a witness or not, or 
to insist on seeing documentary evidence or not.  They have no duty to explain their 
awards, and the awards can be set aside only if the arbitrator engages in fraud or 
corruption, or possibly if he should engage in “manifest disregard of the law.”  But if 
parties to contracts choose to define the rights they create by their agreement as those 
to be fashioned by an arbitrator, who can complain? 
For half a century, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts interpreted the 
1925 Act in keeping with its purpose.160  They did not permit the use of arbitration 
clauses to prevent citizens from enforcing their statutory rights in law courts.  Until the 
Supreme Court began to change its mind in the 1970s.  This was a time when the 
federal courts were concerned about rising caseloads and the prospect of a sizeable 
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Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331 (1997); Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation: The “National 
Policy” of the Supreme Court, 3 Nevada L. Rev. 259 (2002). 
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increase in the number of federal district judges.  And alternative methods of dispute 
resolution were coming into fashion as a means perhaps of making civil litigation more 
civil.  It was obvious that a more robust arbitration law would get a lot of troublesome 
cases presenting mere issues of fact off federal dockets and reduce the need for more 
judges.  Suddenly the Supreme Court reversed itself and declared that arbitration is just 
another and less costly way to enforce a legal right.  And if a party agreed to arbitrate a 
future dispute, even in a contract of adhesion, it should not matter if his claim was not 
based on the contract containing the arbitration agreement but on federal statute 
enacted to protect the party against whom the arbitration clause is invoked.  Nor even 
state legislation.161  In other words, no state can assure its citizens of access to its 
courts to enforce rights it has established for their protection from overbearing conduct 
by persons or corporations who are in a position to draw them into an arbitration 
agreement. 
In explaining how this happened, the Court has sometimes expressed the 
unfounded assumption that arbitrators will enforce legal rights and will forego their 
historic empowerment to do justice as they see fit.  In what Alan Rau has described as a 
quixotic footnote,162 the Court suggested that arbitral awards in statutory cases might be 
subject to judicial review for errors of law.  The Court’s reassurance that arbitrators 
enforce legal rights even if they are not seen to do so has been revealed for the illusion 
that it was, and is, by recent holdings of lower federal courts that parties may not agree 
that an arbitral award rendered pursuant to their contract shall be subject to judicial 
review for a mere error of law.163  To allow parties to create jurisdiction to review awards 
would be an unwelcome increase in the demand for judicial services.  The Court has not 
been willing seriously to address the issue. 
Law made in this free spirit by the Supreme Court now seriously impairs the 
enforcement of many public laws enacted by legislatures with the expectation that they 
                                                 
161 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984). 
162 The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 Tex. Intl. L.J. 449, 526 (2005). 
163 E.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services Inc. 341 F 3d 987 (9th cir en banc 2003); see 
Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. Kan. L. 
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would be invoked by private parties.  Many state courts have been resistant to this 
radical judicial legislation,164 and many cases and disputes over the matter continue to 
rage.  Much of the legislation enacted by Congress and by state legislatures to protect 
consumers and other vulnerable persons may now be entrusted to enforcement in 
private forums that may or may not be bound by the law.  That has been the fate of 
federal antitrust law, the laws protecting investors, and even the minimum wage law.  
Yes, even a worker seeking his right to receive the Congressionally-prescribed 
minimum wage may be required to ask an arbitrator not bound by the law to give it to 
him.165  Yet Congress has barely noticed.   
With one exception.  In 2002, I was retained by the National Association of 
Automobile Dealers to explain to Congress why dealers should be exempt from the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses in contracts they make with manufacturers.  
Congress had long ago enacted the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act to protect 
dealers from overbearing conduct by manufacturers; it assured them of the right to a 
trial by jury on the question of whether a manufacturer had dealt with them “in good 
faith.”166  Similar legislation was enacted in nearly all states.  When cases were brought 
under those laws, the manufacturers usually won, but the laws had a benign effect on 
the way the manufacturers treated their dealers.  The dealers recognized that their 
claims of right under state or federal laws would be substantially weakened if they were 
forced to present them to an arbitrator who would not be bound by the law, who would 
not be obliged fully to investigate factual disputes, whose jurisdiction depended on the 
franchise agreement, and who might be more considerate of the interests of the 
manufacturer who would be far more likely to have another occasion for employing 
them.  Congress was persuaded by their concerns and a law was enacted to provide 
                                                 
164 E.g., Harold Allen’s Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Butler, 825 S.2d 779 (Ala. 2002).  Cash in a 
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that automobile dealers are no longer forced to arbitrate future disputes with automobile 
manufacturers.167 
How did this happen?  While small in comparison with manufacturers, automobile 
dealers are sizeable firms and important to the communities in which they are located.  
They have political clout, and Congress heard their cries for help.  But we said nothing 
to Congress to imply that those who buy automobiles should not be bound by their 
arbitration agreements with their dealers.  Other franchisees selling other goods and 
claiming rights under state or federal laws enacted for their protection may be able to 
enforce those laws only in an arbitral forum that is free to do whatever it thinks just.  And 
consumers, workers, patients, investors, borrowers, and diverse others who may think 
they are in some way protected by state or federal statutes may also find that they are 
forced to seek enforcement of their rights in tribunals having no accountability for their 
fidelity to the law.  Farmers who grow chickens for processing firms are now seeking in 
Congress legislative relief similar to that accorded the automobile dealers.  What are 
their chances? 
The conclusion I draw from these examples is that the Supreme Court 
sometimes unwarily takes leave of statutory texts in order to shape the law to the tastes 
and convenience of the judiciary of which it is a part.  As the renovation of arbitration 
law attests, Justices are so far removed from the concerns of citizens having limited 
means and capacities that they can be blind to the consequences of the law they make.  
And Congress and the Department of Justice may take no notice, whether the result is a 
serious impairment of the enforcement of federal laws or a gratuitous trespass on the 
sovereignty of a state, or merely a misguided deprivation of ancient civil rights. 
On those occasions, rare in the last century, when Congress has been moved to 
enact laws bearing on judicial administration, it has been moved to do so by a political 
interest group with a specific substantive agenda, such as “tort reform” or the 
suppression of securities fraud claims.168  It is fair to say that its ventures into 
procedural reform have seldom been effective in advancing the interests they were 
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intended to advance, and have often served to elevate the costs imposed on all sorts of 
litigants.  Indeed, it seems at times that Congress has also lost its bearing in 
distinguishing its role from that of the courts and may be less interested in enacting wise 
legislation than in deciding contested cases in accordance with its own lights.  Its recent 
effort to overrule the Florida courts’ decision that Ms. Schiavo should be allowed to die 
is a spectacular recent example.169  One hesitates to ask such a Congress to think 
about matters of constitutional importance.  And is it not possible that such antics by 
Congressmen are in some measure a result of the dreadful reforms imposed by the 
Court on our election laws? 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATION 
Whatever Congress’s own troubles, its attention to issues of judicial 
administration is overdue.  Amending the Constitution is no answer to the need to re-
establish the duty of Congress to govern the judiciary.  The suggestion has recently 
been heard in Congress that the federal judiciary needs an inspector general to alert 
Congress of their occasional failings.170  Perhaps that is a useful idea.  But such an 
officer would lack the influence or resources to address any of the issues presented in 
this essay.  What then can be done?  Structural changes are not only very difficult to 
achieve because of the resistance of the organized legal profession and the 
incomprehension of the public but also carry risks of unforeseen adverse secondary 
consequences.  There are, however, proposals worthy of serious consideration by the 
judiciary committees of Congress.  Their mere discussion might have a benign 
transformative effect by causing justices and judges such as those sitting on 
committees of the Judicial Conference to be more conscious of their human tendencies 
to be too much preoccupied with their own status and power.  I suggest eight examples 
of questions to which Congress might usefully attend. 
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The first, of course, is the problem of superannuation and the possible enactment 
of a law imposing term limits on the Justices.  Or as Roger Cramton and I have 
proposed, one providing biennial appointments, with reduced duties for those most 
senior in service.171  That would be a modest change posing no serious threat of 
unwelcome secondary effects.  It is one that most people who are not lawyers can 
readily understand and appreciate.  Reasonable minds can differ about the details of 
the scheme, but any flaws in the scheme would be subject to change if need be.  And 
by addressing the problem directly, Congress will have signaled that it is alive to its 
responsibility to check and balance the Court. 
This proposal should be elevated above all others because it is politically viable.  
One need not be a political sophisticate, or know, or even care very much about law 
and courts to recognize the blatant improvidence of allowing persons afflicted with 
normal human failings to conduct  public business in a temple for decade after decade.  
Reasonable term limits for justices is a reform likely to be opposed in Congress by 
lawyer–romantics, but not by many others who seriously consider the problem. 
The other issues Congress should consider are more complex.  A second item 
on its agenda might be to give consideration to the question of how the cases going to 
the highest national court should be selected.  It would do much to correct the false 
grandeur of the Court if the judges selecting the cases to be decided were not precisely 
the ones making the decisions on the merits.  For example, I would favor a law 
combining the term limits proposal presented in the Appendix with a change in the 
certiorari jurisdiction.  The senior justices, in addition to sitting on rulemaking 
committees and lower courts, might participate in certiorari decisions or might even be 
given exclusive authority to rule on certiorari petitions.  If need be, they might be aided 
by circuit judges selected by seniority and serving short terms as acting justices on the 
certiorari panel.  Or the Court could be gradually enlarged to a number of justices 
sufficient to achieve that result.  Those selecting the cases would then not be the 
justices who would decide them.  And Congress could consider specifying a number of 
cases that the senior panel would be expected to certify to the junior panel for decision.  
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This would re-establish the role of the deciding justices as judges who decide cases that 
is their job to decide, and not lawmakers who choose what laws to proclaim. 
Third, repeatedly over the last forty years, proposals have been advanced for the 
establishment of an additional national court that would provide oversight of the courts 
of appeals, resolving conflicts in their decisions, and enabling them to concentrate on 
their intended role of providing visibility to litigants and close oversight for the district 
courts.  Alternative schemes have proposed a unification of the courts of appeals to 
provide rotating panels with specific substantive agendas and nationwide jurisdiction.  
For example, the Federal Circuit devoted to intellectual property law might be replicated, 
but with modifications to prevent narrow specialization by the judges.172  Although such 
ideas have been advanced by distinguished committees,173 including one led by 
Senator Roman Hruska and one led by Justice Byron White, none of these schemes 
have received serious attention in Congress.  If a second national court were 
established to oversee the courts of appeals, and also as proposed the justices 
selecting cases for decision were separated from those deciding the cases, those 
justices selecting the cases could be empowered with the alternative of sending 
appropriate cases raising issues of federal statutory law to the new court.  This would 
be a role for which experienced senior justices would be especially well suited. 
Fourth, consideration might also be given to re-establishing the rights of litigants 
to have their appeals from district court decisions heard in person.  Given the availability 
of inexpensive videoconferencing, there is no good reason why a panel of judges 
deciding an appeal from the judgment of a federal court should not be required as a 
                                                 
172 On the origins of that institution, see The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—A 
History 1982–1990 (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991). 
173 I directed a study by the American Bar Foundation that was advised by ABA Presidents Bernard Segal 
and Leon Jaworski, by Circuit Judges Carl McGowan and Thurgood Marshall, and by other eminent persons.  
Accommodating the Workload of the United States Courts of Appeals (1968).  A committee appointed by Chief 
Justice Burger, led by Paul Freund and Alex Bickel, two icons of the time came to similar conclusions; The Report 
of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F. R. D. 573 (1972).  Next came the Commission on 
Revision of the Federal Court Appeals System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 
67 F. R. D. 195 (1975); that commission was chaired by Senator Roman Hruska (R. Neb.). Then came the 1995 
Report of the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, chaired by Hon. 
Edward Becker, Chief Judge of the Third Circuit, and reported at http//www.uscourts.gov.lrp.CVRPGTOC.com. and 
finally the 1998 Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals chaired by 
Justice. Byron R. White.  Every one of these reports has advised Congress to make major structural changes. 
 
 44
form of appellate due process at least to appear on their computer screens to engage in 
dialogue with counsel.  Why should they not be expected to provide at least an oral 
response to arguments as in the traditional common law proceeding?174  The 
rediscovery of the oral opinion on the law rendered by individual judges might result in 
major economies in the work of the intermediate courts, and serve to give litigants 
direct, observable evidence that the judges themselves decided their cases. 
Fifth, Congress might reconsider the needs of the Supreme Court and courts of 
appeals for staff support.  Scot Powe has suggested that a reduction of law clerks in the 
chambers of justices from four to two or even one might providentially encourage earlier 
retirements.  A similar reduction in staff for the courts of appeals might serve to reduce 
the preoccupation of the circuit judges with their writing of the law of the circuit.  For all 
appellate judges, a reduction of staff might be expected to increase the likelihood that 
the judges would learn less from, and react less to, their staffs and would be more 
attentive to the legal briefs and arguments of colleagues and counsel.  And 
consideration might be given to elevating all magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges 
to full rank; they could then enter judgments in all cases and be made directly 
accountable to the courts of appeals. 
Sixth, related consideration might be given to repealing the authority of the courts 
of appeals to sit en banc.  This would also serve to refocus the work of circuit judges on 
deciding cases in the common law tradition on their factual and legal merits and 
diminish the attraction of making law in the form of opinions of the court.  Given the 
illusory and tentative nature of the law of the circuit, the loss could not be expected to 
have grave consequences.  This reform would fit neatly with the creation of a second 
national court.  Also, if en banc decisions were eliminated, the number of circuit judges 
could be increased more readily to supply the judicial manpower needed to staff the 
appellate due process of oral hearings and explained decisions. 
Seventh, similar consideration might be given to the reestablishment of the trial 
as a means of resolving disputes.  Congress should think seriously about whether civil 
juries should number twelve.  Relevant matters not raised in the previous discussion 
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might include expanding the availability and use of videoconferences in trial and in 
pretrial discovery of evidence or the possible use of more court-appointed expert 
witnesses to serve as consultants to the trial courts on technical factual issues, of the 
sort familiar in the courts of virtually all other nations, in lieu of the adversary expert 
witnesses who are seen in American courts, who occupy much time and attention and 
magnify costs. 
Eighth, Congress should surely consider whether parties invoking statutory 
rights, even those conferred by state legislatures, can or should be required to test their 
claims and defenses in private arbitral forums that are not bound by the law.  If need 
really must be, consideration might be given to adopting the system employed in 
California state courts that enables private parties to “rent a judge” whom they 
choose,175 but whose judgment is subject to possible review in the state appellate court 
for its adherence to the rules of procedure and its fidelity to the law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
All eight of these reforms could be enacted without threat to the rightly cherished 
independence of the judiciary.  If all were done at once, an approach I do not 
recommend, there would still be no offense to Article III.  And there are surely many 
other ideas afloat that are worthy of consideration as means of redirecting the attention 
of the institutions of the federal judiciary to the work we hire our judges to do.  That is to 
resolve our disputes in a manner that commands our respect and acceptance because 
it is apparent to all that eminent independent judges have paid close attention to our 
evidence and our arguments and have decided our cases on the law, as best that can 
be discerned from the sometimes fuzzy utterances of Congress or the generalities of 
the Constitution.  Serious consideration short of enactment of these reforms might alone 
serve to correct some of the flaws they aim to redress.  Our federal courts, including the 
Supreme Court, might regain a sense of their own mortality and fallibility and appreciate 
the wisdom of deference to the law, to other branches of government, and to the people 
they serve, a deference that sadly declined through much of the twentieth century. 
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